This is the hundred-sixteenth in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.
It’s another two-part scenario in Vietnam: Tour of Duty. This time, however, I don’t need the structure of the multipart scenario to “teach” me about the event – I am currently reading about this battle in Hue 1968.
MACV’s response to the capture of Hue was hampered by a number of factors. First and foremost, they did not believe that the insurgents had the level of force with which they had used to capture the city, leading them to believe that the city hadn’t really “fallen.” This failure persisted even in the face of field commanders reporting contradictory but accurate eyewitness information. Secondly, Westmoreland was in the process of shifting forces around in anticipation of NVA incursion across the DMZ. Bases were “in between” occupants at a time when they should have been providing critical support.
Once the Battle of Hue is joined, the book focuses first on the U.S. Marines and their attempts to recapture Hue from the South. The Americans retained a position at the MACV compound, south of the Perfume River (on the opposite bank as the Citadel), and used it to regain control of the city. This, however, isn’t the whole story. The freshly-relocated 1st Cavalry was positioned north of the city, at Camp Evans. They were tasked to enter Hue from the north. They too were led to expect little in the way of serious opposition.
![](https://ettubluto.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/tet12.jpg?w=1024)
What they found instead was the headquarters of the 416th PAVN battalion, who were fortifying the twin villages of Thon Que Chu and Thon La Chu, and the command center for the entire Hue operation. With command not appreciating the extent of the opposition, the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Cavalry Regiment were flung into battle on February 2nd without support. Even as they were driven back and pinned down*, orders from above encouraged the battered 2/12th to attack and continue to make for their objectives further south. It was only by, on his own initiative, executing a retreat via a bold night maneuver that local commander Lt. Col. Richard Sweet was able to save his battalion from annihilation. In the event, the 2/12th suffered 60% casualty rates.
Finally appreciating the formidable defenses before them, the 1st Cavalry spent more than two weeks increasing the intensity of their attacks against the communist stronghold. The position was overrun on February 21st.
As I say, it was fortuitous that I was reading this background as I undertook the pair of scenarios The Battle for Thon Que Chu, parts 1 and 2. The two parts portray, respectively, the initial assault (February 2nd) and the final assault (February 21st) over the same ground. Naturally, the hour/hour-and-a-half scenarios don’t provide any of the bigger picture that makes this particular corner of the Battle of Hue so compelling.
The biggest difference between the two versions of The Battle for Thon Que Chu, as far as I can tell, is the presence of an M-42 Duster in the second scenario. The M-42 was a mobile air-defense vehicle produced in the 50s and retired before it could be deployed. The Jet Age made anti-aircraft guns mostly obsolete. In Vietnam, however, the HAWK anti-aircraft missile was performing poorly at low altitudes and so three battalions of M-42s were sent to fill this gap. In the fields of Vietnam, the M-42 downed few airplanes but its 40mm guns were found to excel as an anti-infantry weapon, particularly effective against the communists mass attacks.
My guess was that Tiller simply wanted to maximize the use of his Thon Que Chu map rather than provide any true insight into the role of the 1st Cavalry at the Battle of Hue.
Return to the master post for Vietnam War articles or continue on with tales of another bombing run.
*The location where the 2/12th was trapped by the enemy was called, by the soldiers, “This F***ing Place” or TFP. Hue 1968 explains this and Mark Bowden does not demur from using the full expletive.