This is the Dark Part of the Year

Tags

Cold War, mudhens, Squad Battles, Squad Battles: Vietnam, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations

Happy New Year. May this one be better than what we are leaving behind.

Amazingly enough, it was one year ago when I began playing a new entry in the Vietnam Combat Operations series, which started off the year 1967. The next entry in that progression, I suppose it goes without saying, is Volume 6, which starts off halfway through that same year. Perhaps it says something about 2020 that I was only able to progress 6 months of fantasy time in a whole year of real time. Of course, a large part of it was my detour into the Six Day War, consuming six months of my time on with barely a few days of fighting. That said, January 2020 seems like a long, long time ago.

This is the seventy-first in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

As a result of such a gap, I kind of forgot that Vietnam Combat Operations did switch over at mid-year. My usual habit is the syncing the scenarios in Squad Battles with those of Vietnam Combat Operations, and that fell out of sync.

My special forces over Hill 1338 en route to the Dak To special forces base.

As I pick back up with Volume 6, I notice some familiar terrain. The area around Dak To was the location of the first of the reasonably-sized scenarios from the continued half of the year, giving us a chance to see (after the fact) how well it reflects back at the operational level. At least, I hope so. I actually may have messed up a bit. While I am airlifting my LRRP unit into the vicinity of Dak To (above screenshot), where intelligence suspects the 24th PAVN Regiment. My patrols haven’t found them yet, so I have my main Airborne battalions moving by ground transport rather than airlift. Being slow, my unit will not be in place to engage in company-scale combat on June 22nd, as it should historically. As you can see below, I did manage to find some enemy on Hill 1338 no more than a day or two behind schedule, whatever that’s worth.

There they are, right where they are supposed to be.

Waiting another couple of turns, I run into some familiar action right around the DMZ and Con Thien (below). The AI has pushed the fight a little farther to the east than I would reckon it from the Squad Battles scenario, but that’s all right by me. Notice the carriers and battleship all sitting off of the coast. The closer Charlie comes to the ocean, the harder I’m going to smack him back. This screen capture I got during the AI turn, which is always a bit tough. Enemy units tend to flash on and off the screen along with assorted attack animations. I didn’t get any of the latter, but you can see both a portion of the attack NVA plus their artillery support further north. Next turn he’s going to get his.

Big guns firing across the DMZ are about to deal me a bit of a blow.

While I’m getting myself all realigned, I also thought it worthwhile to toss in one more July ’67 Squad Battles scenario. This one is another user-made scenario. At their best, the user-made scenarios explore aspects of the game engine that are absent from the stock scenario list and that’s what going on here. The scenario, S&D* at X Lam Va, isn’t going to appear in the operational-level treatment – both because its too small and I’m pretty sure it’s a hypothetical. What it does provide, beyond the run-of-the-mill, are two items. First, the pair of attacking American platoons have the kind of massively-superior firepower that characterized much of the Vietnam War. Both platoons have radio communications and there is plenty of artillery support to be called in. Secondly, it asks the player to conduct a rapid raid and extraction, hinging victory on your ability, not just to get in, but to get out.

Platoons actually have radios!

The off-board artillery is nice and makes the scenario feel more like reports that I’ve read. The extraction is a little more problematic. First, I do wonder whether an operation would have been conducted under such a tight clock – one hour to get in and out where a failure to stick to the time table meant abandoning American soldiers in enemy-held territory. Second, as I’ve complained before, the ability to extract forces can be flummoxed if friendlies get pinned, especially combine with a loss of leadership. In the screen grab below, the highlighted unit is pinned down (by friendly short-rounds, no less). When my platoon leader went to get them moving again, he was shot and killed by nearby VC. No way these guys are going to make the extraction plan (which was to pass through the village and be picked up in clearing at the top of the screen).

Pinned down with a loss of leadership.

Another interesting, and not-immediately-obvious feature of the scenario is due to the lack of on-board victory locations. As a human player, I know I’m trying to stomp on any VC present in the village. The AI attaches no sentiment to the village whatsoever. That means that the VC will, realistically I might add, try to escape the American hammer rather than stay and fight to the end. I’ve not seen that before.

In the end, I obviously messed up a few things, including the timing of the extraction. Had I wanted to put in the effort, the right way to play this scenario would have been to actually plan out the number of turns necessary to remove one’s forces and back the entire timeline out from that. That’s a little too much work for a casual game. It’s also not really worth it (again, to me) to replay the scenario to correct my problems the first time through. After all, I managed to get some of it right.

Now forward through the second half of 1967 and a much-anticipated 2021.

‘So long to the worst year of my life,’ said she.

Worst Year – The Mudhens

So say we all.

Return to the master post for more on the Vietnam War. Continue forward for more TOAW and Squad Battles goodness.

*Search and Destroy.

You Say Qabatia, I Say Kabatiya

Tags

Arab Israeli Wars, Command Ops, Israel, Jordan, Middle East, six-day war, The Operational Art of War

I’m closing in on having all the pieces to make a small scenario in Command Ops 2. I’ve learned a few things. I’ll share.

Or Qabatiya. That’s fine too.

For an initial scenario, I want to focus on the battle around Kabatiya. First some background.

This my eighth in a series of posts on the Six-Day War. See here for the previous post, also about maps, or here to go back to the master post.

 

In the first days of June, 1967, as war in the Middle East became inevitable, Israel held out hope that King Hussein of Jordan could be convinced to sit this one out. These efforts failed, leaving Israel in the dark as what Jordan might do. To this end, in addition to some reservist brigades, Major-General Elad Peled led a mechanized division – two armored brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade – sitting north of the Jordan-held portion of the West Bank. It was well-positioned to move to engage the Jordanians (and the Iraqis, one assumes), from wherever their attack might come. The Israeli’s war plan called for a rapid assault to take the Sinai and was focused toward the south. Israel did not plan to attack in the North, either to take Jerusalem or to capture the West Bank.

Similarly, the Egyptian plans focused on moving through the Sinai and rolling up Israel from the south. Their plan for their Jordanian allies was more as an anvil, against which to smash the retreating Israelis. This meant no particular objectives for Jordan until the forces of Egypt had moved into the vicinity of Jerusalem and points north. Nevertheless, the king did not want to be seen as doing nothing – thereby losing face in the Arab world. He needed to contribute to the great victory over Israel. Thus, when he received the message from Egypt that they were advancing from victory to victory, he decided to engage.

The Jordanian attack came, north of Jerusalem that is, came in the form of artillery bombardment of the area surrounding Tel Aviv and of the Ramat David airbase. They used batteries of U.S.-made “Long Tom” 155mm guns. For bombarding the airbase, those guns were located in the Dothan Valley (the relatively featureless band in the upper left corner of the above screenshot). To protect the airbase, General Peled was tasked to create a plan for neutralizing the guns and begin an attack, all in about six hours.

What Peled came up with was to assault the Jordanian defenses at Jenin by means of an end-around. This would hit Jordanian positions unexpectedly in the rear and command the high ground to the south of the city. The rapid maneuver was successful, disabling the Jordanian artillery, throwing back a Jordanian counter-attack, and moving into position, poised to capture Jenin. At this time, intelligence reported a large force of enemy armor advancing from the South.

In response, a recon element was dispatched to the south to locate the approaching Jordanian forces. It found the 40th Armored Brigade but was itself surrounded and cut-off. Peled’s attention and that of his attacking force was now divided. While Jenin was isolated Jenin, the reduction of the Arab defenses was still ongoing. The main Israeli armored force was in no shape to rush to the rescue of their trapped compatriots. The command decision was made to allow the Peled’s armor to rest and resupply while using air power to support the trapped elements.

The resulting battle lasted through the remaining daylight of June 6th – some 12 hours. After nightfall, the Israelis were able to form an armored attack force and use a flanking maneuver to open a hole in Jordan’s defensive positions. This allowed the reconnaissance units to escape. Herzog’s describes, as I read it, one of the more dynamic battles of the war: Mobile forces jockey for control of a road junction while initiative and force superiority shifts back-and-forth between the sides. It seems like an ideal battle that could be isolated and recreated. I would say there are three distinct portions of the battle which could get more specific focus. The initial meeting engagement between the recon elements and the leading forces of the Jordanian 40th Armor resulted in the Israelis being isolated but not destroyed. The recon unit then fought for most of the day in what must have been a lower-intensity battle, using anti-tank guns and air superiority to prevent being overrun by a superior force. Simultaneously, Israeli tanks were trying and failing to break through the Jordanian lines. Lastly, there is the night action which culminated in the ultimate Israeli victory.

Depending on the way this cake is sliced, the scenario might be considerably more manageable and more appropriate to the Command Ops engine. For example, by skipping out on the stalemate portion of the battle, one might be able to ignore the modeling of air strikes and how that may or may not fit in with the World War II -era computations. I don’t know, though. It may be that the air strike modeling of base game, circa 1944, would still work. The rough situation is not outside the WWII experience. In Normandy, the Allies’ total air superiority meant that ground support aircraft (what the Germans called Jabos, “Hunter-Bombers”) could 100% dominate German movement given light and decent weather. Still, this wasn’t the situation in the Bulge, or on the route to Arnhem, the engagements which the Command Ops airstrike algorithms were developed. More thought on this later.

Allow me to point out a few other details that are popping up as I try to put this scenario together.

At this point, most of my effort is still focused on building the map. Scroll back up to the screenshot at the top of  the post. See those dashed lines? That is track and trail, as indicated (mostly) on the British pre-war maps. You might be thinking that this is a lot of track in a small amount of terrain. You would be correct, but this isn’t even the worst of it. If you could see the larger map, this webs can come to dominate terrain. In my previous post, I talked about warnings against excessive detail when it comes to these features. Beyond the question of whether it nullifies the surrounding hills and vegetation, I wonder if I’m creating mountains of nonsense numbers for the pathing and sighting algorithms to crunch. On the other hand, if all I’m doing is creating greater and lesser -preferred routes through the hills for tank and halftrack movement, that might not be a bad thing.

Similarly, my map is way too big for my proposed scenario. In the North and West, I stretch far enough to capture Ramat David airbase. Eastward, I wanted to get the whole of the Jordan valley so as to potentially capture the “diversionary” fighting that accompanied the attack on Jenin. Will all that map mess bog down the game when I’m only using may 1/10th of it? I guess I’ll find out.

Last time I also wrote that I’d look into more detail about translating statistics for new guns and vehicles. To build a “estab*” for the Six Day War, I started with my work on the Bir Gifgafa scenario. That effort used as its basis the Cold War estabs built for the Battles from the Bulge version of Command Ops (this, if I remember). That, in turn, has its origins in user efforts to create Eastern Front scenarios. While the latter seemed to be a serious effort to create high-fidelity, accurate models, the former project (much like mine) was intended to ballpark the modern weaponry for sandbox purposes. With each iteration, of course, any errors in data (including perhaps mistakes I made working on the Suez Crisis) are carried forward and even compounded.

In all of this, I came across a Developer diary article. In it, the team talks about their project to develop an official Eastern Front package for Command Ops 2. He mentions these issues with the accumulated Eastern Front data from across the years. The article is a good read, talking mostly about how to accurately model gun accuracy from first principles (as opposed to historical testing data). It highlights the pitfall of picking out data posted somewhere like Wikipedia for a weapons system and trying to translate into Command Ops data.

I also am using those Cold War estabs as a guide for the detailed makeup of both Israeli and Jordanian forces. How many trucks in an Israeli battalion command unit? Well, how many are in the U.S. version? In addition, I’m combining data from a handful of other sources that I have ready access to. As with the Independence War, Balagan.info has articles on the Six Day War, including an order of battle for Israel and for Jordan. Wikipedia also has an order-of-battle for the conflict as well as a list of weaponry. Add to that the games that I’ve already played on the topic (Steel Panthers, TOAW4) and maybe those I haven’t (The Star and the Crescent‘s Jenin scenario). It’s some good depth of information, but it is not all self-consistent (as with the spelling of my focal town’s name).

One fairly-recent treatment (2013 isn’t new, but its newer than Avalon Hill) is the Panzer Grenadier adaptation Panzer Grenadier (Modern: 1967: Sword of Israel. By dedicating itself to this one week of battle, it would seem to be presenting a more accurate and rigorous look the Six Day War that previous efforts. One also assumes that the Panzer Grenadier system (which I did buy but have yet to play) is an improvement on the likes of Panzer Blitz, despite the scorn sometimes heaped upon publisher Avalanche Press. It even features a scenario on this very battle, modeling the moment of where Israeli armored attacks facilitate the breakout of the trapped forces at Kabatiya. The game hasn’t gotten much love. Although its score on Board Game Geek is respectable enough, it bears the shame of a “gray” scoring badge indicating too few reviews and rankings. My opinion – $150 plus shipping and handling is a big number** for a basic hex-and-die-cut-cardboard-counter game.

Dismount!?

While working on all this “research”, I discovered something I’d never noticed before in TOAW4. There is a check box to actively manage the transport for motorized and mechanized units. This is an option that was not (as far as I know) present in TOAW3, nor is it explained in the manual. The only explanation I’ve found is the “hover” text, also shown at the bottom of the screen. From this I divine that it can be used to free-up transport resources for supply purposes if their attached unit is going to be emplaced defensively. I guess it goes without saying that I’ve never actually used this when playing a game. I wonder if it would make a difference?

Return to the master post for the Six Day War or continue on to the next article.

*Force makeup files for Command Ops 2.

**I opened up my PanzerBlitz box and found the AH price list. The Arab-Israeli Wars was $16. (Plus 10% for shipping charges witin the USA). I also realize I have the original General issue with the “new” Lebanon scenarios. I totally forgot I’d bought that!

Taking Bank

Tags

Arab Israeli Wars, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Mark Herman, Middle East, six-day war, The Operational Art of War

The TOAW scenario for the war in the West Bank provides an overview of the fighting that meshes very well with the narrative from Chaim Herzog’s The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. I suspect that a key reason for that is that good sources for tactical details may be a little thin on the ground and that the scenario is sourced, to a large extent, from the very text that I am reading.

This my fifth in a series of posts on the Six-Day War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

 

While it is authored by a different person, this West Bank scenario makes a fine accompaniment to the Sinai front scenario which I had played earlier. I’m being a little glib about the “single source” for scenario development. He explains that this scenario is originally based on the 1977 Mark Herman board game The Battle for Jerusalem 1967. However, the notes also cite a number of sources used to update using information that has become available in the 30 years since the board game’s publication. Arab-Israeli warfare stands in contrast to American engagements, like Vietnam, where there is extensive written detail from both the military and the memoirs of veterans.

Coinciding with reality, the Jordanians are considerably easier to deal with than the Egyptians were. In Sinai 67, early tactical achievements were necessary to demoralize the Egyptians and force them to withdraw. Without that historical advantage, it becomes very difficult to beat the scenario. In West Bank 67, although there are a few challenging fights here and there, it is relatively easy to steadily force Jordan from the West Bank. The game makes clear that key element in the Israeli victory was the mastery of the air. Interdiction prevents Jordan and Iraqi reinforcements from coming into play and limits the ability of Jordan to maneuver defensively.

Heavy fighting in Jerusalem’s Old City.

I’ll highlight a couple more remarkable features of this scenario. The design is more “zoomed in”  than what seems “normal” to me. Comparing West Bank 67 with Sinai 67, the map scale is the same for both, but the unit “counters” are a level finer grained. Whereas in the Sinai, we mostly maneuvered at the battalion level, in the West Bank we move individual companies. Comparing with the Vietnam Combat Operations series and its more encompassing map (2.5 km versus 4 km), the unit scale differential is also similar. This may not seem like a big deal, but when you see a recon unit with only 3 vehicles total, it doesn’t feel like a typical TOAW game. Compare also with Middle East ’67, where the map is zoomed in (1.6 km / 1 mile) but the unit representation is larger.

A tank company survives the war intact.

Another impression is that West Bank 67 gets the dynamics of the war about right. Even as the scenario came to an end, Israel retained her fighting power. In other words, the campaign didn’t just turn into a battle of attrition. Israeli units are capable of completely annihilating their counterparts while surviving relatively unscathed. This is contrast to most TOAW scenario as well as scenarios from other engines. The downside to this is it seemed almost impossible not to achieve a decisive victory. Both the scenario notes and the victory screen make it clear that Jordan will be crushed. Even with a decisive victory, you have simply matched the performance of the Israeli forces in the Six Day War.

Return to the master post for the Six Day War or continue on to the next article.

War of the Sons of Light

Tags

Arab Israeli Wars, Egypt, Israel, Middle East, Middle East '67, six-day war, The Operational Art of War

Like I said, I’m going to play some of these scenarios while reading the appropriate sections from the book The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, by Chaim Herzog. I’ve just finished the section on the Sinai Campaign and am wrapping up a pair of operational scenarios dealing with that same front. One is in The Operational Art of War (TOAW) and one in Modern Campaigns – Mideast ’67 (ME67) .

The TOAW scenario Sinai 1967 focuses on creating a single-player experience for an Israeli player who must reproduce the lightning campaign through the Sinai desert from the Six Day War. It’s a scenario that’s interesting because of its limitations. The ME67 scenario, Gaza and Beyond, is even more limited but it far more traditional in its design. First to TOAW .

Day 1, assault on Rafah.

Sinai 1967 has a nicely developed designer-notes package with historical background, instructions, and design philosophy. I’ll try not to simply repeat that information here. Essentially, the idea is to ask the player to repeat Sinai campaign, conquering the entire peninsula in a mere six days. The war opens with a theater-wide airstrike that hands Israel nearly complete domination of the air and, with that executed, the scenario opens. In addition to air superiority, Israel has an opening shock bonus to simulate the surprise of their attack and the confusion of the Egyptian forces.

Killing tanks near Kuntillah.

The scenario is built around the key locations seized by Israel and the resultant shock and confusion this caused in the Egyptian command. If the player takes the historic junctions by the morning of the second day, Egyptian field marshal Mohamed Abdel Hakim Amer will panic and attempt to withdraw the Egyptian forces from the Sinai. If not, the player must fight an alt-history battle where the Egyptian forces contest the Sinai and recover from their initial panic.

Morning of the second day and I didn’t make it.

Looking at the above screenshot, taken in the morning on June 6th, I am a bit behind schedule. Historically, the Israeli’s had taken Rafah on the 5th and by the morning of the 6th were ready to launch into Al Arish. My forces were still undertaking mop-up operations at dawn in the Rafah vicinity, meaning I had no hope of capturing Al Arish on the historic time table. However, take a look at these dispositions, because I think they will look familiar later on.

This is what creates the depth for this scenario. There are essentially two sets of deadlines. The first is to capture enough in the first day of the war to achieve the requisite “shock and awe.” Depending on whether you have, you then have one of two end games. In one, you pursue a fleeing Egyptian Army towards the Suez Canal, attempting to reproduce the second half of the Israeli campaign. In the second, Egypt has decided to stand and fight, and you see how effective you are against that tactic.

As I write this, I am attempting to get a win under that second set of conditions. What I’m finding is Israel is heavily weighted towards the north. While I am pressing forward there, I am taking a pounding in the south, where Egypt is refusing to turn tail and run. I’m also running against that perennial opponent in TOAW, the supply system. Supply is a critical component of the TOAW modeling and, by the end of the second day, my supplies very much depleted in my combat forces. Resupply is done through the system and is controllable only indirectly, through maintaining ownership of hexes between units and their supply sources. To make a long story short, I’m not sure that I can get my units resupplied in time to be effective in a six day war. Nor am I sure whether my resupply problems accurately reflect the constraints on the Israeli command. Nonetheless, this is a recreation of this campaign that illuminates the historical factors.

Opening moves.

ME67 is, at the same time, both a more interesting and a less interesting take on this battle. We see a scale that is still at that operational level, although a slightly finer grain than TOAW. You may recall a discussion on scope and scale when we fought over this very same ground back in 1956. I had been pleased with the explicit treatment of day/night cycles before. While it remains a clear discriminator, I wasn’t as excited about it this time. Is it too much detail to have me engage in a night turn without asking me to explicitly manage how I disengage and then reengage the at dawn? This case makes me wonder if it isn’t better abstracted away?

Another obvious difference is in the graphical interface and the feedback it provides. ME67 abstracts each unit as a primary weapon. See for example the above screenshot (clicking should display full scale), where the 82nd Tank Battalion is represented as 52 Centurion tanks. Compare and contrast that with TOAW. In Sinai 1967, the 82nd is represented as two different counters and details not only the tanks, but the halftracks, armored cars, infantry, and mortars allocated to the formation. The key advantage for ME67 is that the “tank” representation is very visual. As I watch my vehicles fall by the wayside, I’m getting some immediate feedback on the health of my force. TOAW‘s accounting is more detailed (see, particularly, the Loss Report screenshot further up), but it is considerably less visceral. Whether one is a more accurate simulation than the other depends on your thoughts about the relative merits of Tiller’s algorithms versus Kroger’s.

Orientation.

My play was inhibited by a lack of familiarity with the Tiller UI system. It always takes me a few scenarios to remember how the little icons interact with the UI. Worse are the functions that aren’t tied to the little icons. For example, it was Turn 5 before I remembered how to turn on the map labels (and experience I found illuminating enough to include as its own screenshot, left). I continue to have trouble with “on foot” versus “travel mode.” Are they meant to be used separately? I decided to focus entirely on “travel” mode (an icon that looks to me like some sort of Wiccan pentagram), but even then I have considerable trouble remembering to bring units in and out of the mode as I would consider appropriate.

Final situation, west of el Arish.

For all of my little blunders, I managed to bring my forces near the last two objectives (just outside of el Arish) on the final turn, having captured the major objectives further to the East. This is very, very similar to the third screenshot from TOAW, above, but (once I get over the non-American date style) exactly one full day behind schedule. Even still, this earned me a major victory.

That brings me to my biggest complaint here. For all that the game/scenario is getting right, in the end it leaves the impression of simply an implementation of one particular battle in the Tiller engine. Whereas TOAW sets the play some specific goals – meeting the historical timetables to gain historical advantages, ME67 lacks that unique feeling. It’s not that its bad. It has the right units, the right map, and a pretty effective scope/scale. But the gameplay style involving the surround of the enemy hex followed by multi-turn attrition of the defending unit – this seems more than a bit out of place in the lightning war that was that of the Six Days.

Happy Endings

Tags

Cold War, Happy Valley, Plague Inc, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations, Wall Street Journal

This is the sixty-third in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series or go back to the master post.

I managed to finish Happy Valley on the last possible night, a night I also completed Volume V of the Vietnam Combat Operations series. This, having just finished, in a marathon effort, another project in right before Covid-19 shut everything down.

Now the rest of the world is finally granting me the social distance that I’ve always craved. Is it wrong to feel a measure of contentedness as the world burns? Probably.

I’ll say, first, about Happy Valley that it was well worth pressing onward and finishing both seasons. The biggest downside is that I struggled sometimes with the northern accent but I refrained from using any subtitles. I think that would have been wrong. That aside, this was a top-notch police drama. Heartily recommended.

The last turn brought with it some of the biggest and most interesting “battles” I’ve yet fought.

As for Vietnam Combat Operations, my final couple of turns provided more action than much of the game so far. There were several areas, particularly near Pleiku (as pictured above, showing part of Operation Francis Marion) and in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin area (Operation Union II), where sizable-looking NVA forces popped up just at the end.

While both these operations saw fairly significant engagement with the enemy, there were no large-scale, conventional-style battles. In both cases, the U.S. command was aware of significant enemy formations in the area, prompting sweeping actions to pin them down and destroy them. Still, as a rule, the communists were able to dictate the terms of engagement. U.S. losses were mostly due to ambush and bombardment rather than set piece battles. As with the war in general, communist losses substantially exceeded U.S. losses, but it was a price that the enemy was willing to pay for victory in the longer term.

As always a draw. The flavor text tastes about right.

TOAW is not, as far as I know, capable of explicitly modeling asymmetric warfare. Neither, however, is it explicitly modelling specific tactics of conventional warfare. I did not try to analyze how the casualty rates compare between this scenario and the historical estimates, nor do I think that would be a worthwhile exercise. As I play, I suspect that I react a lot more vigorously than would be historically accurate. When I see an enemy formation on the map, I try to surround and destroy it, even if that means drawing in units from outside the engaged command. As a result, I should probably see higher casualties, in many cases, relative to the actual battles. I actually suspect, if I were to dig into it, that the modelling isn’t doing that badly.

In the end, Vietnam Combat Operations is not trying to predict casualty rates and probably shouldn’t be seen as doing so. Getting lethality wrong, even systematically wrong, doesn’t necessarily destroy the scenario suite’s concept. Every six months (at least at this point in the series) there is a “reset” to bring everything back in line with historical reality. As I’ve said before, from the standpoint of the (U.S.) player, the results do appear correct. Even as an enemy “counter” disappears, what does that mean? PAVN units were rarely “wiped out.” They did, however, get “removed from the map” sometimes for the better part of a year. This wasn’t destruction or surrender – it was the soldiers scattering and then reforming in a remote area or in Cambodia/Laos, to refit and reinforce. The scenario seems to get this right, particularly once you’re willing to interpret what you are seeing in just that way.

As you see from my lower screenshot, I once again scored a draw. As I’ve said earlier, I’ve come to play this series by focusing on the suggested goals first and foremost. While wargaming as a whole is enjoyed as a “what if” exercise, keeping mostly to the script insures that I engage in those fights that the scenario author has prepared for me. As I said, I think I’m a little more vigorous that my historical counterparts. I also try to grab easy victory point locations (if they are nearby), even if they aren’t identified in the historical operations. As such, I think I should be doing better than average, points-wise. It is hard to see how this scenario is “winnable” without breaking the game, but then I sometimes lack imagination.

One thing I can imagine, moving abruptly to my third point of happiness, is the scenario pitched by a Wall St. Journal editorial in this morning’s paper. The authors, who do have a dog in this particular fight*, argue that remote work activity was already in our future. The current lockdowns and precautions will mean that companies and workers are forced to rapidly adopt telecommuting, even if they would have otherwise found it unthinkable. Give everyone a few months and they will learn that the unthinkable is, in fact, reasonable and (for many, even) an improvement over the status quo. They predict that once we all get used to a distributed workplace, nobody will want to go back.

As I stated at the outset, I’ve been social distancing before it was cool, although I probably moved too far ahead of the curve to be good for me. I suspect that while the “new normal” will include a lot more telecommuting, employers will be most likely to trust those with which they’ve had a traditional, cubicle-centered relationship up until recent events. But this isn’t all about me. I will say that, in my experience, a (purely) virtual workplace is healthy, happier, and more productive all at the same time. I wouldn’t be surprised if many more people come to this same conclusion. Let us wait until next fall and see if the authors are right.

Return to the master post or proceed to the next article, somewhat out of order, where I watched (or maybe rewatched) the 1987 film Hamburger Hill.

*They are management at a company called Nomadic Learning, which has been advocating for the shift for some time.

Conjunction Junction, How’s That Function?

Tags

Bau Bang, Cold War, Radio Commander, schoolhouse rock, Squad Battles, Squad Battles: Tour of Duty, Squad Battles: Vietnam, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations

This is the fifty-ninth in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

In February of 1967, preparations began for what was to be one of the the largest operations of the Vietnam War, code-named Operation Junction City. The offensive targeted the communist stronghold referred to as “War Zone C” with a massive invasion intended to trap and destroy what was referred to as the “mini-Pentagon,” an informal term for the Central Executive Committee of the People’s Revolutionary Party. This was the administrative headquarters directing the anti-government forces in the South.

The operation has an unprecedented scale for this scenario series. In the weeks before Junction City is to take place, preparations such as this diversion, are among the player’s tasks.

In gaming terms, I had some high hopes for this operation. It is covered by scenarios in three (or four, depending on your counting method) games; Vietnam Combat Operations, Volume V in The Operational Art of War, a scenario in each version of Squad Battles, and a campaign scenario in Radio Commander. In some ways, it provides an unprecedented opportunity to compare different games and different scales while looking at a single battle. The key is the scale of the operation. Junction City itself lasted for 82 days and that can be pushed to over 100 if you include preparatory operations such as Operation Gadsden. The U.S. forces committed included much of the 1st Infantry and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. This is potentially 30 turns in Vietnam Combat Operations with a maneuver area this actually meshes well with the TOAW mechanics.

Horseshoe? It is hard to separate hammer from anvil in this screenshot. In what is considered by some to be bad luck, the “horseshoe” faces downward.

As I’ve explained, the scenario manual instructs you which units were historically involved in the operation in question and directs you how to place them historically. Satisfactorily doing so will earn you victory points as well as help match your play with the built-in triggers. You are, of course, free to deviate from the historical path in whatever ways you see fit.

Operation Junction City consisted of a horseshoe-shaped static perimeter intended to isolate the area containing the mini-Pentagon and to prevent enemy from escaping the operational area. With the perimeter established, a massive mechanized force entered the open end of the horseshoe from the south, sweeping north. They would either engage the enemy forces and annihilate them or force them against the waiting forces of the prepared perimeter.

In the end, my massive operation netted little more than a captured supply base.

The problem was, the communists, perhaps alerted to their vulnerability by sources inside the South Vietnam government, were able to move their logistics center to Cambodia and avoid being trapped by the operation. What engagements there were resulted in lopsided American victories, but the large scale battle where the U.S. expected to have a clear advantage did not materialize. While casualty ratios (per U.S. estimates) were on the order of 9:1, that did mean a non-trivial loss approaching 300 American servicemen in addition to equipment losses. In this, the scenario accurately recreates the operation. Besides a few inconclusive (and obscured by the game’s fog of war) battles, my only result was the location and destruction of an enemy supply center.

A very nice array of assets. both armor an artillery.

Absent a major, defining battle, one probably can’t expect the tactical-level games to integrate in any way with the operational treatment. For the Squad Battles scenarios, there is really nothing about them that gives a uniquely “Junction City” feel to them. In fact, the first of the two fits in just as well with one of my previous articles as as it contributes to this topic.

March 20th, around about midnight, saw a VC assault on a Fire Support Base 20 near the village of Bàu Bàng. Such an assault was anticipated by the American command, due to its proximity to a known communist stronghold, and so forces (3rd Squadron) from the Fifth Cavalry Regiment were deployed to defend the artillery. This fight is sometimes designated as the Second Battle of Bàu Bàng, the first having been fought in November of 1965. When I played a (First) Battle of Bàu Bàng in Steel Panthers, I suspected that a research error had caused some M48 Pattons to incorrectly make it into the order of battle. It is this, the 1967 scenario where the defenders have a mix of M113s and M48s and the Squad Battles setup accurately provides them.

Now, for all my complaints about deviation from historical lethality, my results in this scenario were very much matched to the historical results. I wound up losing only one AFV (it happened to be the one highlighted in the above screenshot) whereas the U.S. lost two vehicles to enemy fire in the portion of the actual fight modeled* by the scenario. Although the ability to rapidly react and to establish and expand a perimeter was a key element in the U.S. victory, I mostly fought from fixed positions. In any case, the scenario gives the (American) player a nice mix of armor and artillery. It’s a slaughter, but that’s the reality. The real-world casualty ratio was pushing 100:1.

Another fire base defense scenario.

Move ahead a day, and we get to the next of the Squad Battles scenarios. This one was part of the Squad Battles: Vietnam package, as opposed to Squad Battles: Tour of Duty, but like the first it is a fire base defense scenario. In this case, the defenses are manned by dug-in infantry of the 4th Infantry Division. What’s special about this scenario is that it (as seen in the above screenshot) models the direct fire capability of the artillery batteries using flechette ammunition, also called “beehive” rounds due to the buzzing noise they produce on their way to their target. Direct fire from defending artillery was often a factor when defending a fire base and this scenario allows the player to experience this capability hands-on.

Cavalry riding to the rescue.

As with the previous day’s action, armor was a factor. The player is granted four tanks to rush toward the sound of the guns. Moving them at maximum speed, they can engage the enemy for the last few turns of the scenario. In my case, they may have contributed to the salvaging of one of the victory locations, although it is hard to tell. I also lost a tank to RPG fire during the advance, which is consistent with the historical results. It was a hard-fought battle, but it is an easy win in game terms.

Another Radio Commander intro sequence, in the voice of an embedded reporter, answers my question about Coleman’s rank. Is he a grunt?

On to my third tactical scenario, this one from Radio Commander. First off, the campaign sees fit to address some of my open issues from previous steps. The cinematic intros continue, this time via commentary from a civilian reporter. We’re now clear on Coleman’s educational background and rank. What I don’t understand is whether or not an officer, provided they lead troops in the field, would have qualified as a “grunt.” Was this how the term was applied 50+ years ago? Besides that, I finally have my company up to full strength. I’m in command of three platoons instead of the usual two.

Dropped behind enemy lines, my guys need to find and trap the guerrillas.

I can’t knowledgeably comment on the historicity of this scenario. The action is too small and, frankly, too uneventful to be notable. It is certainly possible that something very similar happened at this time and place, but to verify or disprove that would take more effort than I’m willing to put in. I strongly suspect, instead, that this is yet another example of making a scenario that encapsulates key points from the larger battle, but at a scale more appropriate for the game.

Operation Junction was the largest airborne operation in the Vietnam War. By Vietnam, the U.S was seeing the need for parachute drops being, well, dropped in favor of helicopter insertions. The drop of 845 paratroopers was only a small part of the overall operation, but a noteworthy part. In my (above) operational game, I missed my chance to use the 173rd in their paradrop role. As I was reading the instructions, I actually inserted the second battalion of the 503rd via helicopter before I realized they were supposed to use an air drop. I probably lost some mission points for this, but given that I had more than enough helicopter transport to go around, my way was likely more effective otherwise.

The Radio Commander scenario, Hammer and Anvil, has an early AM drop of your subordinate company. Once in position, they are to push the enemy toward waiting mechanized elements of the 196th Brigade. This small-scale drop takes place about a month after the historical airborne operation. My gut tells me there was nothing that actually corresponds to this configuration of forces.

Herding cats. Armed, communist cats.

That aside, the scenario is an interesting in terms of its different approach. In this go-around, the objective is not to engage and defeat the enemy, the trick is to force them to move in the direction that you want them to. In doing this, there are plenty of things that can go wrong. You can miss them entirely, as you pass by them in the jungle. They can slip around your flanks or through the holes in your forces, escaping out of the operational area. They can achieve sudden, local superiority and teach you a nasty lesson. In short, it reflects the experiences of America’s large-formation operations against the insurgency.

There also seems to be, tucked away, a scripted event meant to advance a story line about war crimes. I’ll avoid commenting too much… for now. I will say that fictional battlefield atrocities seems like a cheap way to make a point, particularly if it is untethered to reality either through actual events or at least statistical occurrence.

That bit aside, I’d say all four of these scenarios provide some useful insight into various aspects of this operation, even if none of them are quite the gaming challenge that one might be hoping for.

Return to the master post for more Vietnam War articles. The next article looks at a hypothetical as implemented in a user made scenario – with a twist.

*As is often the case, it is hard to pin down what segment of the battle, exactly, is represented by the scenario. The battle went on for something like 4-5 hours before massive air power drove off the VC. Despite the effectiveness of mechanized units against the assault, it is estimated that the bulk of the enemy losses were due to airstrikes.

Happy New Year

Tags

Cold War, Squad Battles, Squad Battles: Vietnam, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations

This is the fifty-seventh in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

A new year deserves a new year in my gaming world as well. Time to move from 1966 into 1967 and the Year of Big Battles. Surprisingly given the phrase used to describe this phase of the war, there are no operation-scale, big-battle scenarios – either in The Operational Art of War (TOAW) or within the other games I’ve been playing. Perhaps this is because, once the U.S. got its big battles, they wound up being, more often than not, entirely one-sided. Against full-scaled U.S. operations, the insurgents either fled or got walloped.

So it looks like I’ve got an array of 1967 scenarios that are fairly similar to what we saw for 1966. Despite that, who doesn’t want to mark the passage of time. And who better to herald the New Year than the United States Marine Corps?

The Marines are chasing some guerrillas into the hills in the southern part of Quang Nam. Note that I have both artillery and air support.

The next scenario in the Vietnam Combat Operations series, this time Volume V, starts of the 1st of January 1967 and covers the first half of the year. Although January 1967 saw operations all up and down Vietnam, we’ll focus in on the Quang Nam province in the center of the I Corps zone. The focus is because this time and place, and the Operation Tuscaloosa that was active here, is also covered in Squad Battles: Vietnam.

In my version of Tuscaloosa (see screenshot above), I encountered some unknown insurgent activity a bit further south from the battle that actually took place. The river crossing marked Go Noi indicates an island that was a Viet Cong stronghold and it was near here that the Marines in Operation Tuscaloosa fought a bloody battle. Given the variability of Vietnam Combat Operations and the fog of war, I ended up on a different river. Over a period of a couple of weeks I have been bringing in reinforcements so that, by the time of the screenshot, I have 3 battalions engaged plus artillery and air support. It’s a bigger operation than the historical one. Still, its nice to feel a connection of sorts.

Ambushed while crossing the river.

The battle portrayed in Squad Battles: Vietnam is split into two scenarios. The fight took place on January 26th, 1967, when two companies of Marines were ambushed as they attempted to cross the Thu Bon River. The point that they had chosen for the crossing had a large (500m wide) sandbar which separated two branches of the river. While the Marines had prepared for the possibility that their crossing would be contested, they were not aware that the VC had the entire sandbar targeted from entrenched positions on the south bank of the river.

The first scenario in this pair has you commanding one company of Marines just as they are ambushed by the Viet Cong. The Marine plan, on encountering resistance, was to call in artillery support and then frontal-assault the enemy positions with H Company while the second company, F, moved into a flanking position on H’s left.

Fire for effect!

I am always pleased to have access to the fire support that would have been realistically available in engagements like these. In both TOAW and in Squad Battles, I feel that indirect fire is less effective in the game than it was in reality. Author John Culbertson, who fought in Operation Tuscaloosa and wrote a book about this engagement, estimates around 50% of the casualties resulted from the 155 mm fire. It can be hard to tell with fog-of-war settings on, but Squad Battles casualties from artillery seem to stay within the single digits, percentage-wise.

There’s no way that I can take the enemy-held objectives, but I feel like I have to do something.

As my artillery support ended, there were still a handful of turns left and I had a strong position on what appeared to be the enemy’s right flank. If this weren’t a one-off scenario, I’d have been tempted to wait for air support or reinforcements. There weren’t enough turns remaining in the game to take the two additional objectives (seen in the above screenshot near the center of the enemy line and in the village behind his left wing), so assaulting the enemy position seems more like an easy way to squander victory points than a game-winning strategy. On the other hand, waiting out the scenario’s end would be boring and so, seeing as I had a tactical advantage, I crossed the second branch of the river and attacked.

It is not clear from the scenario setup whether the forces in this scenario are supposed to represent H company or the flanking F company. Perhaps it is a scaled-down version of the entire two-company fight. In the historical battle, H Company was ordered, following the artillery bombardment, to frontal-assault the enemy positions. Supported by flanking fire from F, they were able to overrun the VC trenches. There were 55 Marine causalities during the battle, a steep price to pay for a sandbar. 57 VC bodies were found and another 60-70 were estimated to have been killed but removed.

Not having read any account of the battle before I played, I did not strive to duplicate that historical result. Despite being considerably more timid than the actual commander, I was still able to achieve a minor victory per Squad Battle‘s scoring.

The counter-attack is a more typical company versus company engagement. No support here.

After the crossing had been secured, the VC battalion headquarters was determined to be located in the village of Le Bac. The second of the two scenarios has a rather typical company-on-company assault scenario. It is better than some of the jungle scenarios in that the relatively open terrain allows for reasonable maneuver.

For this second scenario, the artillery support is absent, even though it was still available and still used in the actual assault. In the historical attack on the village, the artillery was decisive. The Marine advance through the village consisted more of mopping up the dazed survivors of the artillery barrage as opposed to the house-to-house fighting that Squad Battles requires for victory. Requiring the player to fight for the village makes for a much more interesting game then watching the artillery do all the work for you, so this is one difference I won’t complain about.

Happy 1967 and Happy 2020.

Continue on to the next article in the series where I discuss my having watched the film Rescue Dawn. Return to the the master post, here.

Pacifier

Tags

Campaigns of the Vietnam War, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, Road to Disaster, Squad Battles: Tour of Duty, Taking the Offensive: October 1966–September 1967, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations

This is the forty-seventh in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

To those who saw Vietnam as a growing failure, the results from from the battlefields of 1966-1967 demonstrated that failure. Road to Disaster describes the the strategy of seeking large-scale engagements as “attrition,” and as a fight that Westmoreland was clearly losing. The narrative is that U.S. commander through this period, in adding more troops to the fray, was simply throwing good lives after sunk costs. His repeated requests for increases came on top of a decided lack of progress. In other words, while he could show nothing so far he would claim that “just 100,000 more soldiers” would turn the stalemate into a victory.

There is another side of this argument. At the time, Westmoreland’s claim was that he was showing substantial improvement and that the additional troops would hasten the achievement of victory for the U.S. The numbers, it was said, showed solid progress, particularly in contrast to the year before. It was asserted that the ability of the communists to continue the war was being steadily degraded. While that assertion seems to have been proven entirely wrong by the Tet Offensive in 1968, I don’t think it is quite as far-fetched as it might seem in retrospect.

Taking the Offensive: October 1966–September 1967 gives a counterpoint to Road to Disaster‘s tale of disaster. This version not dominated by the ultimate failure to save South Vietnam and the anti-war post-analysis that is so prevalent today. This is now the third in the five-part Campaigns of the Vietnam War, a booklet-type format summarizing the major phases of the U.S. Army involvement in Vietnam. Compared to the first two, it is considerably less dramatic. For the most part, it summarizes the Army’s operations, breaking them down by region. Perhaps more interesting here is the Analysis section at the tail-end of the book.

That analysis is generally positive about the performance of the Army during this period, a sharp contrast to the gloomy outlook of Road to Disaster. Whereas VanDeMark cites the “attrition” strategy as utter failure, both in general and particularly through 1967, Taking the Offensive explicitly calls it successful. As evidence it cites the 10:1 loss ratio between insurgent and U.S. forces. In the first nine months of 1967, there were 66,000 communist deaths compared to 10,000 South Vietnamese forces and 7,000 U.S. servicemen. Furthermore, they calculate a disparity in replacement rates, after which the U.S. force rose by 66,000 while the communist forces declined by 20,000. Another metric cited is the percentage of the rural population living under the government’s control rose from 44% to 48%.

Part of that latter figure is related to the relocation of civilians to refugee camps in secure areas. Even Taking the Offensive acknowledges the problem with tracking, as a good thing, the creation of refugees by forcible removal from their home villages. By the numbers, it both increases the population under government control as well as denying the communists the resources (whether provided voluntarily or under duress) that they would obtain from the local population. While Road to Disaster goes into considerably more detail about the inability of the South Vietnamese government to care for refugees, Taking the Offensive refers to the “squalid refugee camps” “straining the ability of provincial administrators to care for” the refugees which contribute to the ostensibly positive pacification numbers.

One final area where Taking the Offensive and Road to Disaster diverge is in their assessment of the health of that South Vietnamese government. Road to Disaster paints a rather bleak picture of a dysfunctional system. The rather-compelling conclusion is that saving South Vietnam was simply impossible due to a government that was entirely unworthy of popular support. Worse still, it seems that there wasn’t anyone competent waiting in the wings. One might conclude that the War in Vietnam was essentially lost with the removal and assassination of Diệm who, for all of his faults, seemed to have been a capable administrator. This fits with the story of Road to Disaster, the essense of which is analyzing the failure of the Kennedy administration to do what it should have known was right. In this case, it seemed that Kennedy would have put a halt to U.S. support for the coup, had they just got themselves a little better coordinated. Taking the Offensive, by contrast, talks about “the growing political stability of the South Vietnamese state.”

The campaign in Binh Dinh, where the 1st Cavalry moved in to again clear insurgent forces from areas near the populous coast, is included in Taking the Offensive, but only to introduce the situation of mid-1967. The U.S goals in targeting the province in the fall of 1966 occur too late for the series’ previous installment and apparently too soon to feature in the current one. In the more detailed Combat Operations series, operation Irving is in the Stemming the Tide book, it coming right on the transition between defensive and offensive operations. Within that context, Stemming the Tide doesn’t tie the operation into the pre-Tet offensive campaign in terms of impact. It does give the military details, which are a primary source for the Vietnam Combat Operations TOAW scenarios. Nevertheless, Vietnam Combat Operations Vol. 4, per its subtitle (Counteroffensive II), it is grouped with the U.S. offensive actions that extend through 1967.

1st Cavalry deploys to the Binh Dinh coastline to search the Kim Son Valley.

The TOAW scenario steps through the phases of the American search for the 3rd PAVN Division in Binh Dinh province. You are instructed to create a headquarters at LZ Hammond (the highlighted hex, above, near the center of the screen) and allocate your forces in a mix – some active and some in reserve. As I described earlier, executing the historical operations grants you extra points towards your score. It also sets you up to properly trigger engagements with the enemy as they should occur historically. Of course, and this is the point isn’t it, it also lets you choose to alter those historical engagements.

After making themselves scarce in the Kim Son Valley, the 95th Battalion attacks my base at LZ Hammond

For example, as I was beginning to redeploy my forces away from Kim Son and into the mountainous area just west of Hoa Hoi (see the red victory point flag on the coast), a sizable enemy force showed up just outside LZ Hammond. Historically, this was a ten-minute bombardment that occurred in the middle of the night, notable (mostly) for the damage it caused. One American serviceman was killed and 32 were wounded, while 17 aircraft were damaged. Searching for the enemy turned up nothing; they were gone by morning.

In my pretend version, I moved all the forces that I could spare in an attempt to trap the attacking enemy near my strong point. It’s a level of reaction entirely out of place for 10 minutes worth of mortaring, no matter how destructive that fire may have been. Now an operational level treatment doesn’t go into that kind of detail – I can’t distinguish between an attack by mortar crews as opposed to an attempt at infantry overrun. From my perspective in TOAW, I had identified a large (potentially superior) enemy formation and therefore I planned to destroy it. It’s an interaction closer to what really occurred near the coast when multiple companies of communist forces were pinned down in the village of Hoa Hoi.

The Hoa Hoi scenario specifically includes the command helicopter of Lt. Col. George W. McIlwain,

That most significant battle of this campaign, that engagement at the village of Hoa Hoi, is presented as a scenario pair in Squad Battles: Tour of Duty. The scenarios were put together by John Tiller himself, so I was again looking forward to seeing the engine put to its best use. Obviously, with only two steps to the scenario, it is not the breaking down of the battle into key parts which worked so well before. The two scenarios correspond, more or less, to two major phases in the historical battle. In the first phase, the U.S. command was made aware of a communist presence in Hoa Hoi but had no idea to what extent. A platoon was inserted to determine what was there. When the platoon met significant resistance they soon realized that they were facing a numerically-superior force.

Of considerably more interest are the Huey gunships.

The first scenario portrays the insertion of a platoon into a hot Landing Zone. As is typical for Squad Battles, it ignores any landing zone preparatory bombardment (no off-board artillery here), but does allow you to designate your LZ “on the fly,” so to speak. In the two preceding screenshots, you can see my helicopters approaching the area around the village, coming in from the south. Instead, I flew them around to the northeast (see below).

Perhaps the highlight of this scenario is shown in the second of the two above screens. The insertion is supported by two Huey gunships with rockets. To me, this allows something closer to what an American unit in a contested landing might expect in terms of air and artillery support.

I felt better about losing my two gunships when I began the second scenario and saw the wrecks of all three aircraft from the prior scenario.

Unfortunately, my use of those gunships ended up in some embarrassment for my command. Even before I could get my guys landed, I lost both of the air-support helicopters to enemy fire. Both in the real calculus of that war and in terms of victory points, whatever the success of the infantry’s mission, that significant loss of assets is not going to look good on paper. I did, in fact, do pretty well with this scenario once you set aside the downed helicopters, but losing two “vehicles” meant a loss on points. My sense of failure was mitigated somewhat in that when the second scenario is loaded, all three helicopters from the first scenario on present on the map as wrecks. I have not read that the actual battle had significant cost in terms of support aircraft. In particular, I would think if the command helicopter would have been shot down during the operation, that would have been notable. I don’t know if John Tiller had sources that I didn’t read, or he was just starting you at what seemed to be a likely outcome of playing that first scenario.

That second phase of the battle includes the final assault on the village with a full battalion of troopers. The second scenario in the pair begins with the helicopter lift of those forces and ends with successful (or not) capture of the village. In this, the scenario has the features that I complained about in the single-scenario battles. The reinforcement and, ultimately, replacement of the initial platoon began shortly after the fighting started; as soon as U.S. commanders realized what they faced. Yet, despite a desire to take out the enemy quickly (before they had a chance to make their escape under cover of darkness), the final attack could not be organized before night fell. The assault and capture of the village actually took place the following day, using forces that were encamped overnight around the village.

What this highlights for me is the inability of these games, or any games, to determine the conditions under which history could be changed in the Vietnam War. Whether or not a player can beat history during a particular campaign or battle seems not to be what would tilt the outcome to a victory. Assuming one accepts the premises of Road to Disaster, the key factors resided in the political. U.S. politics, in terms of the extent to which the Johnson presidency was willing to risk drawing in China or the Soviet Union into a broader war. Also South Vietnamese politics as, ultimately, a military victory could only be sustained if it was followed up by good governance which would gain the support of the people. Many of the best Vietnam War games do model these political factors and the “morale” impacts that determine the support of the people. In all cases, though, the results of these calculations and whether they result in the player “winning” or “losing” the war, depend entirely on the assumptions that the game designer creates. Would pursuing retreating insurgents into Laos force the North to the negotiating table or cause the Chinese to send in ground forces? The best we can do is speculate.

Return to the master post for more Vietnam War articles or move forward to a book review.

Can’t You Hear the Thunder?

Tags

ANZAC, Australia, Cold War, Men at Work, New Zealand, Steel Panthers, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations, wargames, WinSPMBT

This is the forty-second in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

For much of 1965 and the early months of 1966, the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), 1st Battalion, fought as a part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade of the U.S. army, engaging the enemy in the vicinity of Saigon. After a year in Vietnam, the 1st Battalion returned to Australia, being replaced by the 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st ATF was a brigade-sized unit which could operate independently of the 173rd. Under Australian command, the 1st ATF contained both Australian and New Zealand forces.

After their arrival, the 1st ATF and its two infantry battalions, the 5th and 6th of the RAR, established a base at Nui Dat, in the Phước Tuy Province, south and east of Saigon. The location placed them so as to interfere with Viet Cong supply routes and nearby a suspected VC base area. The force was tasked with securing the area around Nui Dat, protecting the local population and government from VC harassment, as well as supporting the bigger picture in the III Corps tactical zone (the area outside of Saigon). From their initial deployment, there was intelligence warning of a VC attack of up-to-four-battalion strength.

While the 1st ATF pursued the rumors of enemy formations throughout the late spring and early summer, it wouldn’t be until mid-August that significant contact was made. While the evidence of large VC units in the vicinity continued to build, fighting was, at its most expansive, in company-sized engagements. Follow-through never managed to locate the suspected enemy positions. On the night of August 16th, into the morning of the 17th, the base at Nui Dat came under heavy mortar attack, once again indicating a significant enemy presence nearby.

Three Viet Cong formations are detected north and east of Nui Dat. This may be more than the Aussies want to confront on their own.

Naturally, the scenario Vietnam Combat Operations, Volume IV, depicts this encounter and the subsequent operations around Nui Dat. The fight also is shown in detail within a pair of scenarios from Steel Panthers: Main Battle Tank (SPMBT). This gives an opportunity to offer some thoughts on the limits of The Operational Art of War (TOAW) to depict the ground covered by Vietnam Combat Operations.

If you look at the above screenshot, you can see that two VC battalion-sized units are identified in the vicinity of Nui Dat (best located via the 1st ATF headquarters unit at the center of the shot – with an ATF in the center of its graphic). A third, and stronger, enemy unit is located to the east. This additional intelligence may be due to my adventurousness. Feeling pretty confident that the area around Nui Dat was secure ahead of the historical schedule, I pushed east to contest a village, Xuyên Mộc. An ARVN airborne unit holds that strong point and the ahistorical location of that force may be providing additional intelligence.

The point of this detail is that, to my TOAW eye (such as it is), it looks to me that I am facing a superior enemy force. It is speculated that the VC were planning an attack as they knew that the the 5th RAR was operating away from the immediate vicinity of the Australian base. In response to the possibility of being attacked, the Australians sent out company-strength patrols (companies of the 6th RAR) to, once again, attempt to locate the enemy formations. However, the mechanics of TOAW suggest I do differently. Given the knowledge that I am facing strong enemy units, I am not going to move without superiority both in quality and number of units. You may or may not be able to see it in my screenshot, but I immediately returned the 5th RAR to the operational area by helicopter. I brought it, not back to base, but instead into a blocking position to the north of the enemy. At this point I’m trying to calculate how much ARVN support I have nearby and assessing both the practicality and necessity of bringing in U.S. forces to augment my Australians.

Initial contact in the Rubber Plantation. There appear to be a lot more of them than there are of me.

Before I go there, I decided to take advantage of the trio of tactical-level scenarios that are available to me. The first one I tried is Diggers at Work, a Steel Panthers: Main Battle Tank scenario. I started with this one because the date in the scenario description is four days before the actual battle depicted, an error in the scenario write-up. It quite clearly depicts the fighting on August 18th. It begins, as the screenshot above shows, with a company strength patrol through the rubber plantation near the Australians’ base and their encountering of enemy positions. If you’re counting units, the patrol is divided into 3 platoon-strength forces, and this pictures shows the middle fork of the advance.

As I said, the scenario begins with initial contact between the advancing Australian platoons and small groups of VC. It quickly becomes apparent to the Australian player that he is facing a much larger VC force to his front. At this point I was shy of the victory locations, but felt that I had to be on the defensive against this obviously-superior force. The Australian player, also around this time, receives the historical artillery support that allowed the 6th RAR to prevail against vastly superior numbers.

A reinforcing company arrives in M-113s on the enemies left flank, ready to carry the day.

The design of this scenario again brings up the question of how battles are represented in the game engine. The forces appear to be historically sized, although its not clear (neither in the historical record nor because I didn’t turn off the “fog of war” settings to examine the VC side) if the full strength of the communist formation is represented in Steel Panthers. Similarly, the size of the battlefield appears reasonable. The duration of the battle, however, is significantly compressed. The infantry transports carrying the reinforcing A Company arrived some 3 hours after the fighting first developed, almost triple the duration of the entire scenario. By contrast, in a little more than half-an-hour into the scenario we, the player, receive our reinforcements. Perhaps one way of interpreting this is that the “downtime” is stripped out of the gameplay. So the first 10 turns should not be seen as 30 minutes of clock time, but rather as the most interesting 30 minutes (out of 3 hours) for each of the 3 platoons that are engaged. In fact, one might consider that while you are fighting with all three of your platoons simultaneously, the reality you are simulating actually has these fights staggered across several hours of time. Lulls between VC attacks are likewise raced over to get to the next burst of action. In this way, reinforcements arriving half way through the scenario might make sense.

This does, of course, cause problems. I’ve mention before that the tactical-level wargames are generally restricted to the 45 minute-to-an-hour timeframe. As explained elsewhere (perhaps in the PanzerBlitz manual?) the limit on scenario duration is to bring the game to an end before the likes of ammunition shortages, fuel limits, and unit exhaustion become dominating factors. The critical elements for an operational-level game, things such as supply, are ignored in a shorter length game. In this battle, however, during the 5-6 hours in which the heavy fighting took place, ammunition resupply was a major factor. The initial patrol was sent out with just three magazines per infantryman, sacrificing fighting ability for endurance. Where the expected encounter was to consist of chasing small groups of enemies through rough terrain, having a lighter load seemed more important than being ready to engage in an extended firefight. At the same time the relief company was on the way to provide relief, command was desperately trying to get ammo resupply to the besieged platoons.

Immediately, the feel of this one is better than in Steel Panthers. The background thundershower noise probably helps a lot.

For contrast, we’ll move on to the Squad Battles: Tour of Duty representation of the same scenario, The Battle at Long Tan. This version of the battle does not attempt to portray much beyond the initial contact between the searching companies the the Viet Cong positions. What this means is that the resulting game is much more plausible in terms of actual (or at least potential) fighting, keeping it to that first forty-five minutes or so.

Also supporting realism, and contrasting to some of the other Squad Battles scenarios I’ve played, the Australian forces do have artillery support in the form of a single battery on call. It isn’t enough to allow the player to bring in the full impact of artillery support that was so critical in winning this battle but, if we’re sticking to that first 45 minutes, it is may well be that this was before most of the off-board support would come into play.

The ambiance is helped by the thundershower sounds in the background. The miserable weather was another important factor in this battle, although I can’t say how important it is in the the Squad Battles math, much less the other game engines where there is no indication that we’re caught in a storm.

From a purely gaming standpoint, the scenario isn’t so bad either. The map differs from the jungle and the rice paddy maps that we are used to playing, and that’s a good thing. The plantation terrain helps to create much more interesting lines of sight. It allows allows the occasional long distant shot, but it also creates nooks and crannies of hidden spots, even very close by. Movement is also much more similar to the open terrain of the rice fields as opposed to the one-hex-per-turn of the jungle. In this one, the Australians have well-maintained roads along which to advance, adding to the their tactical options.

All things considered, I think Squad Battles does this fight best. That said, I imagine most of us would have a hankering to actually see (and play) those reinforcements to coming in to save the day. Without them, there is no real way to achieve a satisfying victory. One can accumulating the victory points to “beat” the scenario, but you do so knowing that the worst is yet to come.

Here comes the human wave again.

As I indicated, the Steel Panthers scenario package contains two versions of this battle. The second scenario, Made of Stern Stuff, is correctly located in time by its scenario notes. Because of this, it ended up being the last scenario chronologically. In truth, it is simply another representation of the same battle.

I like the map better than the one in Diggers. It is more expansive and more chaotic. In Diggers, if you know what happened in the battle, you can anticipate how the scenario plays out. You know, to start, that the enemy is somewhere near the map’s victory locations. It only makes sense to advance those positions cautiously, ready to fall back on a defensive line when the enemy appears in force. Note that the line of advance is along the rows of the rubber plantation. It means there are long lines of sight which must be broken up by advancing either behind or along the trees.

Contrast that with Stern Stuff. Having just played Squad Battles, I immediately miss the dedicated plantation terrain and the much clearer graphics of that other title. However, this third scenario, using the tools at hand, creates a map that, yes, feels a bit more like a cultivated plantation rather than just wild jungle while still providing an unpredictable landscape for the battle. Lines of sight are less obvious. Also considerably less obvious, particularly at the outset (it is much more obvious by the time I took the screenshot at Turn 7), is where the enemy is. Playing the Australians, you have to begin the scenario attempting to reconnoiter the enemy’s positions. Once the shooting begins, you remain uncertain. Is the entire enemy to your front. Will they be coming around your flanks? Maybe there is another platoon or two behind you.

More support rolling in.

Steel Panthers also, in general and in this scenario in particular, shows an advantage in depicting fire support. As critical as it was in the Vietnam War, it makes a huge difference in gameplay when it works as it should. In Squad Battles‘ The Battle at Long Tan, the artillery support is from a single battery. Granted, this is very early on in the contact and it may make sense that the Australians had yet to bring the full weight of their artillery to bear. However, it emphasizes the weakness of artillery in Squad Battles. With a single gun, it can be difficult to do any noticeable damage with indirect fire. This is a combination of the fact that indirect guns are not particularly deadly and that it is very difficult to consistently achieve direct hits without a line-of-sight from the shooter to the target. In Stern Stuff, catching advancing VC in open ground allows them to be ripped apart by concentrated artillery fire. The trick is to have ground units that can keep track of the enemy’s movements so that artillery can be walked onto the moving targets. In this regard, this scenario gets it right, more so than any of the others.

I think this one also reinforces the idea that in a turn-based game, the “clock” can be a soft and fuzzy thing. Trying to interpret this scenario as an 90 minute slice out of the fighting August 18th fails to capture the intent of the scenario designer. Better to interpret it as bursts of 15-20 minute actions with the 30-40 minute lulls between fighting simply ignored. It would feel a lot more authentic if there were a way to acknowledge the down time and perhaps even model its effects. However, we are talking here about user-made scenarios for a long-time engine, so we shouldn’t get too greedy.

Lastly, in this version of the scenario, I get the feeling (more than the others) that it was made based upon a memoir or personal history. The named locations and other details have the feeling of being pulled from a soldier’s personal recollection of the battle. I’ve gotten used to seeing the War in Vietnam purely from the American perspective. This is one battle where there is extensive information from the Australian’s point of view. It is no wonder that it has been well covered.

Return to the master post for more Vietnam War articles or move ahead to a book review.

Helicopter Valley

Tags

Cold War, Squad Battles, Squad Battles: Vietnam, The Operational Art of War, Vietnam, Vietnam Combat Operations

This is the thirty-eighth in a series of posts on the Vietnam War. See here for the previous post in the series and here to go back to the master post.

Given my critique of the The Battle at Ap Chinh An, one would think I’d be pleased to see what was done with the two-part scenario, The Battle at Song Ngan. We’ll see. Squad Battles: Vietnam has a number of multi-part scenarios and this is the first one I’ve played, so that is one new experience for me in this article. There are also some new experiences in the next iteration of Vietnam Combat Operations, (Volume IV this time), all waiting to be discussed in the context of operations in South Vietnam on its northernmost border.

Operation Hastings was a July, 1966 effort to engage North Vietnamese regular army units that had moved across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into South Vietnam and to force them back across the border. Intelligence placed a divisional headquarters somewhere in the Ngan river valley. The U.S. Marines was to launch helicopter assault to isolate and destroy it. During the initial insertion, three transport helicopters were downed in a collision. The losses and the wreckage earned the battlefield the moniker “Helicopter Valley.”

I find a major enemy formation in the Song Ngan valley a few days ahead of schedule.

Playing Vietnam Combat Operations, Volume IV, I encounter the enemy right where they should be, albeit a few days ahead of the historical schedule. This is one of several engagements in the opening turns of the new scenario.

One can see the improvements made as the scenario author moves through each installation in his series. The 4th iteration has new features as well as features that are just “new to me.” In that latter category I include the custom terrain mods that are used in this series both to better portray the unique Vietnam terrain and just to improve the looks of map overall. You can compare the above screen shot to almost the same area of the map showcased in my earlier article.

Another new feature addresses the issue I talked about while wrapping up that previous scenario. The way this series is designed, the transition between scenarios is, by necessity, not very smooth. Obviously, when breaking up the war per the calendar, at some point one scenario has got to end and the next will begin. There is no way around that. This time around, however, the scenario notes identify the several left-over operations so that, as a player, you can pick what was still going on in the previous game as well as kick-off your new operations. It’s another nice touch in this series. The notes also show when the various ARVN units will be available to assist in U.S. Operations, so you can plan ahead. From the get-go, the enemy seems a little more active than the last round and the South Vietnamese are a little more willing to respond, so the overall feel is that more is going on.

The communist forces also appear a little stronger. Although we can’t yet see them in the above screenshot, there are several communist forces located along the Ngan river and they are fairly beefy. Even with my U.S. airpower (which, also, is curtailed relative to the previous scenario), they’re not going to retreat from those positions easily. Furthermore, with their back to the DMZ, there is no way to for me to surround them, no matter how many extra units I’d be willing to commit.

The Marines move in from one of their two landing zones.

As I started off saying, Operation Hastings is also represented in Squad Battles: Vietnam. It is a two-part scenario, featuring snapshots from the first two days of large-unit contact, on June 15th and 16th. The scenario pair is set up to reverse the roles of the sides. On Day 1, the U.S. forces have to seize the objectives from the communists. On Day 2, they must defend.

Again, as I started with, the first of these scenarios seems to answer some of the complaints I had with my last scenario, which in many ways is very similar to this one. The U.S. Marines begin the scenario mounted on their helicopter transports. Assuming it is one’s first time with this scenario, the player’s only knowledge about the battlefield is given through the location of victory locations. In this battle, however, there are two victory locations indicating the two historical landing zones for the scenario. Putting the units into place (and I missed this a little, as you might tell from the above screenshot), forces the player to make the intended approaches to the enemy’s strong points. Unfortunately, while it forces the player to play a more accurate scenario, it also makes for a more tedious scenario. Particularly on these all-jungle sections of map, the game moves very slowly. Infantry on foot can only advance a single hex each turn through the jungle meaning (again, refer to the above screenshot), the scenario is just about long enough for the attackers to advance to the victory point locations. So while you, as the player, are making choices about moving and shooting, you really have very little option but to execute a head-on advance at maximum speed. Not much “strategizing” left for the player to do.

This is why they call it “Helicopter Valley.”

The second scenario starts you off after you have won the first, but more than a full day later. While the scenarios are not in any way “linked,” the time between scenarios means that the setup for Day 2 probably wouldn’t really depend on how well or poorly you’ve done on the first day. I have to say, though, that I didn’t loose all those helicopters that are displayed as wrecks on the above screenshot. In my play, while I had one of my transports forced down by enemy fire, and I managed a controlled landing without losing any of the personnel. Furthermore, the reason I lost said helicopter was through the rather gamey employment of my transports to provide support fire. From a historical standpoint, that was probably a pretty stupid use of assets. As a game player, though, you learn to make use of what you’ve got.

Even more so in this case where, as in most Squad Battles scenarios, there is no off-board support. Particularly for Part 1, an assault on a known enemy position, this flies in the face of U.S. doctrine. The Marines would have (and did) pummel the communist positions with air and artillery. Once again, however, even the brigade mortar teams are missing from the U.S. order of battle.

It is also worth noting that the reason the helicopters were lost, in the real operation, was that the landing zone was too small for the operation, and two helicopters collided while attempting to off-load their troops. A third crashed while attempting to avoid the first two. The fourth (the above screenshot shows all four) was hit by enemy fire, but much later in the day than what is covered by the first scenario. Those wrecks have absolutely no effect on Part 2 of the scenario pair; they’re just there for looks.

A role reversal. The Marines will try to defend yesterday’s battlefield from counter-attack.

That second Battle at Song Ngan scenario, unlike the first, starts with all units in place. The downed helicopters are the only transports on-map. The scenario places one U.S. Marine company defending the hilltop positions from the previous scenario while a second company moves in to support. It is during this time, after dark has fallen, that the NVA attack the American positions. Even more than the first of the two, the “strategy” component of this scenario is limited. The reinforcing company has just enough movement to get into the battle by the end, but only to support the top right objective. For the in-place company, there would seem to be little incentive to maneuver as each platoon is hard pressed enough to defend its assigned victory location.

Maybe we’ll do better next time.

Return to the master post for more Vietnam War articles or move ahead to a book review.